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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

MEDICAL RECOVERY SERVICES, LLC, an Idaho limited liability company,
PlaintifflAppellant,
v.
BILLY M. CARNES!
DefendantsIRespondent.
Supreme Court Docket No. 36500-2009
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District for Madison County
Honorable Peter D. McDermott, District Judge, presiding.
Bryan D. Smith, Esq., residing at Idaho Falls, Idaho, for Appellant.
Kenneth E. Lyons, Esq., residing at Pocatello, Idaho, for Respondents.
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ARGUMENT
I.
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A.

Carnes Relies On Several Idaho Code Sections That Are Not Applicable To This Case.
Carnes relies on Idaho Code 3 11-506 to support the position that certain property cannot

be used to satisfy a judgment in 1daho.l This interpretation of Idaho Code 5 11-506 is incorrect.
This section establishes only that the "judge or referee may order any money or property of a
judgment debtor not exempt from execution, in the hands of such debtor or any other person, or
due to the judgment debtor, to be applied toward the satisfaction of the judgment." Idaho Code 5
11-506. This section does not state that certain property cannot be used to satisfy a judgment,
but states only that a judge may not order that certain exempt property be applied toward the
satisfaction of the judgment.
Here, Idaho Code 9 11-506 does not apply because there is no order from the court. Further,
Carnes has not cited any law supporting the assertion that an individual may not use certain
property to satisfy a judgment. An individual is free to use any property legally owned to satisfy
a judgment. If Idaho Code 9 11-506 were to be interpreted to mean an individual could not use
certain property to satisfy a judgment as Canes contends, it would prevent many people from
paying legally incurred debts with property they legally own and voluntarily choose to use to pay
a valid debt. For example, if Carnes' contention that exempt property "can not be used to satisfy
a judgment" were true, many retired individuals in this state would be unable to voluntarily pay
their debts as pensions and social security are exempt. Obviously, this was not the intention of
the legislature when it enacted this statute. Such is the case here assuming the money

' See Brief of Respondent at page 5.
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Carnes paid was, in fact, exempt. Carnes voluntarily turned money over to counsel for MRS in
the absence of an attachment, levy, or order to turn over the funds involved. Carnes' reliance on
Idaho Code 5 11-506 to support the premise that certain property cannot be used to satisfy a
judgment is misplaced.
Carnes relies on Idaho Code $5 11-603 et seq. to show that the money Carnes gave to
MRS was exempt from being used as payment toward the judgment. Chapter 6 of Title 11 of the
Idaho Code is titled "EXEMPTION OF PROPERTY FROM ATTACHMENT OR LEVY." This
chapter of the Idaho Code applies only to situations where property has been attached or levied.
In this case, the statutes Carnes relies on are not applicable because there has not been an
attachment or levy. Even if there had been an attachment or levy, Carnes has not followed the
proper procedure to claim an exemption nor shown that the monies he turned over to MRS were
from exempt

source^.^

Carnes informed counsel for MRS that the money in his wallet at the

Debtor's Exam was "money I've saved" "over the last year."3 The Debtor's Exam took place on
February 20,2008, and Carnes testified at that exam that he had worked only four months prior
to the exam, "last ~ c t o b e r . "It~ follows that if Carnes had saved the money over the last year and
he was working only four months ago, some if not all of this money would have been from his
regular wages. Therefore, even if Carnes had filed a claim of exemption he would have faced
the burden of tracing the exempt funds, a burden he has not even attempted to undertake. Carnes
has failed to support the allegation that the money turned over to MRS was from exempt sources
with any admissible evidence further supporting the magistrate court's decision.

Idaho Code Section 11-203 outlines the procedure for filing a claim of exemption.
R Val. I, p p 83-84.
d
R Voi. I, p. 79.
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B.

Carnes Cannot Recover The Money He Voluntarily Paid To MRS.

Idaho courts follow the well settled rule "that a person cannot-by way of set-off,
counterclaim or direct action-recover money which he or she has voluntarily paid with full
knowledge of all the facts, and without any fraud, duress or extortion, although no obligation to
make such payment existed." (Citations omitted). Chinchurreta v. Evergreen Management, Inc.,
117 Idaho 591 (Ct. App. 1989). Although in Idaho this rule has not been specifically applied to

an action for collection of money owed, other states have applied this rule and clarified its
application to such cases. The court in Hassen v. Mediaone of Greater Florida, Inc., has
elaborated on how the above cited rule applies to an action for collection of money owed.

Hassen v. Mediaone of Greater Florida, Inc., 751 So.2d 1289 (Fla.App. 1 Dist., 2000). In
Hassen, the district court affirmed the decision of the lower court when a parly appealed the
denial of a return of funds appellants claimed were taken by imposition. Id. The Hassen court
explained that:
"The pressure or advantage must be of such an extent as to remove the situation
from the ordinary debtor-creditor relationship and negate the voluntariness of the
payment. See Greene v. Alachua General Hospital, 705 So.2d 953 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998);
Greenfield v. Manor Care Inc., 705 So.2d 926 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). Otherwise, the
voluntary payment may bar recovery, in accordance with the usual rule as applied in
cases such as Hall v. Humana Hospital Daytona Beach, 686 So.2d 653 @la. 5th DCA
1996). See also Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Company of California v. McCaskill, 126
Fla. 82, 170 So. 579 (1936); New York Lz$ Insurance Company v. Lecks, 122 Fla. 127,
165 So. 50 (1935). It does not matter that the payment may have been made upon a
mistaken belief as to the enforceability of the demand, or liability under the law, as long
as payment is made with knowledge of the factual circumstances. Hall; see also City of
Miami v. Keton, 115 So.2d 547 (Fla. 1959).And as indicated in Pacific Mutual, payment
should ordinarily be deemed voluntary unless the circumstances present some
constraint or compulsion of such a degree as to impose a necessity of payment
sufficient to overcome the mind and will of a person of ordinaryfirmness."

Id; emphasis added.
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Carnes argues that because the legal definition of waiver is the intentional or voluntary
relinquishment of a lcnown right and because Carnes did "not necessarily" bring the money to
pay towards the judgment, the payment was neither voluntary nor has Carnes waived his rights
under I.C. 5 11-506. As explained above, I.C. 5 11-506 does not apply because there has not
been a court order or an execution and thus the hearing did not implicate any rights under I.C. §
11-506. Additionally, Carnes had full "knowledge of the factual circumstances" and voluntarily
paid the debt he acknowledged without any fraud, duress, or extortion. The record establishes
that counsel for MRS made it clear that Carnes had the "choice" of turning the money over or
waiting for the judge whom counsel for MRS would ask for an order turning over the money.
Carnes' decision to make a voluntary payment is also clear, as he chose not to wait for the judge
to decide, but simply paid the money. Even if Carnes were to have paid upon the "mistaken
belief as to the enforceability of the demand," the payment must be deemed voluntary because
Carnes paid with full knowledge of the factual circumstances (he is presumed to lcnow the law),
and there was no fraud, duress, or extortion. Thus, the district court should have affirmed the
magistrate's decision that the payment was voluntary because substantial and competent
evidence supports it.
C.

Because Carnes Paid The Monev Voluntarily To MRS Without An Attachment,
Execution, Or Court Order. Carnes Did Not Have Any Exemption Rights And Neither
The Court Nor Opposing Counsel Had A Dutv To Inform Carnes Of These Non-Existent

w.

In Idaho, "persons actingpro se are held to the same standards and rules as those
represented by attorneys." Huffv. Singleton, 143 Idaho 498, 500 (2006.) Idaho Rules of
Professional Conduct Rule 4.3 states in relevant part that "The lawyer shall not give legal advice
to an unrepresented person, other than the advice to secure counsel, if the lawyer knows or
reasonably should know that the interests of such a person are or have a reasonable possibility of
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being in conflict with the interests of the client." Additionally, Idaho Code of Judicial Conduct,
Cannon 3 requires judges to perform judicial duties impartially without bias or prejudice. "If
people choose to appear in court on their own, they must familiarize themselves with the
procedures and laws governing their cases. Judges cannot ethically advise litigants on how to
advocate their positions." CitibankSouth Dakota, N.A. v. Schmidt, 744 N.W. 2d 829, 832 (S.D.
ZOOS).
Carnes asserts that he could not have voluntarily paid the money or waived his rights
under I.C. 5 11-506 because one element of the definition of waiver is that it must be a "known
right."5 As explained above, Carnes did not have any rights under I.C. Ej 11-506 because there
was no execution, attachment, levy, or court order. Further, as evidenced by Exhibit " B
attached to the Brief of Respondent, Carnes had previously been served with a writ of execution
and notice of garnishment that included a claim of exemption form and a legal notice explaining
possible exemptions. Thus, Carnes did have lcnowledge concerning possible exemption claims.
Both Carnes and the district court also incorrectly assert that either the magistrate court or
counsel for MRS had a duty to inform Carnes of his potential exemption rights. Again, as I.C.

$5 11-506 and I.C. 11-603 et. seq. do not apply to the facts of this case, there were no exemption
rights to which Carnes was entitled. Therefore, the contention that counsel for MRS "knew the
money was exempt" and "violated" the law without informing Carnes of his potential right to
claim an exemption is not an accurate statement of law or the facts6 Carnes also contends that
because a sheriff must inform a defendant of exemption rights when serving a w i t of execution,
"this requirement should also apply to an attorney during a debtor's exam when it is obvious all

5

See Brief of Respondent at page 7.
See Brief of Respondent at page 8.
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of the debtor's property is exempt."7 Carnes has cited no law to support this position and is
apparently even admitting such when he states the requirement "should" apply to an attorney.
Carnes supports this contention by stating that LC. 5 28-1-203, which deals with commercial
transactions, imposes an obligation of good faith on counsel for MRS. The code sections Carnes
relies on apply only to commercial transactions. They do not apply here to this noncommercial
judicial proceeding. Carnes further argues that "[pllaintiff failed in its duty to enforce this
contract in good faith and should not benefit from this breach of law."' However, Carnes has not
cited any law nor shown which law he claims MRS has breached and MRS is not trying to
enforce a contract. Carnes has not cited any law to support the position that either the court or
counsel for MRS had a duty to inform Cames of exemption rights that did not even exist. To the
contrary, the law is clear that neither the court nor counsel for MRS had a duty to advise Carnes
and both would have been in violation of their respective rules of ethical conduct if either had
advised Cames. Because Carnes did not have any exemption rights and because neither the court
nor counsel for MRS had a duty to inform Carnes of these "rights" at a debtor's exam, even if
they did exist, the district court should have affirmed the decision of the magistrate court.

CARNES CANNOT BE AWARDED ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL BECAUSE HE
HAS FAILED TO ASSERT THE SPECIFIC STATUTE OR RULE
UNDER WHICH HE CLAIMS ATTORNEY'S FEES.
I.A.R. 35(a)(5) states that "[ilf the appellant is claiming attorney fees on appeal the
appellant must so indicate in the division of issues on appeal that appellant is claiming attorney
fees and state the basis for the claim." I.A.R. 35(a)(5). "In order to be awarded attorney fees, a
party must actually assert the specific statute or common law rule on which the award is based;
Id.
Id.
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the district judge cannot sua sponte make the award or grant fees pursuant to a party's general
request." Bingham v. Montane Resouvce Associates, 133 Idaho 420,424 (1999). Further, "this
Court has held that where a party does not state the basis for a claim for attorney fees on appeal,
the claim will be denied. We stated that I.A.R. 35(a)(5), which requires a statement of the basis
for a claim for attorney fees on appeal to be included in the claimant's brief, is necessary in order
to allow the responding party a due process opportunity to challenge such claims." Id. (Citations
omitted.)
Here, Carnes has stated that he is seeking attorney fees on appeal and that MRS has
"pointed out to this Court some of the law in this regard and the Court is familiar with the
frivolous argument and so who, if anyone, gets costs or fees will depend on this Cow's decision.
This writer sees no reason to cite the extensive law in this area."9 Carnes has made a general
request for fees but has not stated a basis for his claim. Because Carnes has not stated the basis
for his claim, MRS cannot properly challenge Carnes' general claim of attorney's fees.
Additionally, Carnes has not contested the attorney fees sought by MRS. Because Carnes has
not complied with the requirements imposed by I.A.R. 35 and this Court, Carnes cannot be
awarded attorney's fees for this appeal.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse the district court's Memorandum
Decision vacating the decision of the magistrate court that found that Cames voluntarily paid the
money. Additionally, this Court should reverse that portion of the district court's Memorandum
Decision awarding Carnes attorney's fees and grant MRS' request for attorney's fees for both the
current appeal and the intermediate appeal.

See Brief of Respondent at page 9
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.Lh
day of November, 2009.

RESPECTIVELY SUBMITTED this

SMITH,DRISCOLL
&ASSOCIATES,
PLLC

Attorneys for Appellant,
Medical Recovery Services, LLC

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

6
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
day of November, 2009, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF to he served, by placing the
same in a sealed envelope and depositing in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, or hand
delivery, facsimile transmission or overnight delivery, addressed to the following:

/D

Kenneth E. Lyons, Esq.
P.O. Box 4866
Pocatello, ID 83206

[>(I U.S. Mail
[ ] Fax: (208)232-8867
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